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COMMENTS
COURT SUPERVISION OF THM ADMINISTRATION
OF ESTATES AND GUARDIANSHIPS
PHILIP H. AUSTIN
In June 1958 The Probate Committee of the King County Superior
Court, under the chairmanship of Judge Eugene A. Wright, initiated
an experiment in court supervision of probate administration. The
primary purpose of the program is to insure that persons serving as
personal representatives of the estates of decedents, or as guardians of
the estates of minors and incompetent persons, are properly and
expeditiously performing the duties of their offices, as prescribed by
law. The writer of this Comment, a third-year law student at the
University of Washington, was employed on a part-time basis to
work for the committee on this program as a probate records checker.
It is the purpose here (1) briefly to outline the operation of the
program and to relate its results to date, (2) to suggest certain con-
clusions with particular emphasis on the question of the respective
responsibilities of court and counsel in supervising probate adminis-
tration, and (3) to comment briefly on several legal problems involved
in the administration of estates and guardianships which the records
checking program has revealed to be apparently misunderstood by
more than a few practicing attorneys.
The records checking program and its results. The probate rec-
ords checking program basically involves a systematic investigation
of the condition of dormant estates and guardianships.1 These are
estates and guardianships which have not been closed by any of the
methods prescribed by law, and which apparently are not receiving
the diligent attention of the personal representative or guardian
required by the applicable statutes and rules of court.
The records checker, using a mimeographed check sheet, initially
searches the files of those estates and guardianships which appear
1 The probate checker's duties also include a daily inspection of each of the estate
and guardianship files docketed on the daily probate calendar for actions by the court.
The purpose of this check is to facilitate handling of the matter when the parties
appear before the probate judge for his decision on the matter presented; e.g., final
account and decree of distribution of estate, petition for award in lieu of homestead,
or petition for the appointment of a guardian. The items checked by the checker at
this time are substantially the same as those checked on inspection of the dormant files.
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from an examination of the clerk's probate docket to be in need of
attention. With respect to estates, the matters particularly noted on
the check sheet are defects in qualification of the personal representa-
tive, including failure to file an oath,2 to post a bond where required
to do so,8 to file an inventory and appraisement, to file proof of pub-
lication of notice to creditors,' to file an affidavit that notice of the
pendancy of probate has been given to all known heirs and dis-
tributees, apparent failure to pay creditors' claims7 and appraisers'
fees,' and finally, failure to take the requisite action to complete
administration as rapidly as possible.9 The matters of particular
inquiry with respect to guardianships are defects in qualification,
including failure to give the requisite notice of hearing to appoint,"0
to file an oath," to post bond where required," to file proof of pub-
lication of notice to creditors," to file an inventory of the wards'
estate,' 4 or to file proof of payment of creditors.' In addition, the
guardianship files are checked to determine whether the guardian's
biennial report" has been filed, whether the guardian's authority to
expend funds of the estate has expired,'7 and finally, whether there is
any evidence in the file to indicate that the guardianship ought to be
terminated on the ground that the ward has attained majority, died,
or regained competency, and a final accounting by the guardian be
made.'8 Both estates and guardianships are also checked to determine
whether the amount of the bond of the personal representative or
guardian is in need of review. 9
After locating the files of estates and guardianships in need of
attention, and searching them, the deficiencies found in each ifie are
noted on the check sheet. The file and check sheet are turned over to
the members of the probate committee for such action as they deem
2 RCW 11.28.170.
3 RCW 11.28.180.
4 RCW 11.44.010.
5 RCW 11.40.010.
6 RCW 11.76.040; Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 41(1).
7 RCW 11A8.010.
8 RCW 11.44.010.
9 RCW 11.48.010.
10 RCW 11.88.030-.040.
11 RCW 11.88.100.
12 RCW 11.88.100.
13 RCW 11.92.030 (incompetence only).
14 RCW 11.92.040 (1).
15 RCW 11.92.040 (5).16 RCW 11.92.040 (3).
17 Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 24.
Is RCW 11.92.040 (4).
19 RCW 11.28.210 (estates); RCW 11.88.100 (guardianships).
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ncessary to cure the deficiency and produce performance of his legal
responsibilities by the personal representative or guardian.
The normal course of events from this point on includes, first, the
mailing of a letter signed by a member of the probate committee to
the attorney of record of the personal representative or guardian, or
in some cases directly to the personal representative or guardian, as
for example where it appears the attorney is no longer practicing or
has died. The letter calls attention to the deficiencies noted, requests
action be taken to explain or remedy the situation, and indicates that
the file will be re-checked on a specified date from four to six weeks
after the letter is mailed. If the guardian or personal representative
is under a surety bond, an information copy of the letter is also sent
to the surety. Then, on the date set for re-check, the checker again
searches the file and reports his findings at that time to the com-
mittee. If it appears that the deficiencies have been corrected, a report
to that effect is made. If some action has been taken and it appears
that the deficiencies will soon be taken care of, an informal continu-
ance of the matter will be granted by the court. But if no action has
been taken or satisfactory explanation made, the matter is then
turned over to the superior court judge who is assigned to probate.
He then will cause a citation to be issued, answerable in three to four
weeks, requiring the personal representative or guardian to show
cause why he should not be removed and a successor appointed." In
0 With respect to estates of decedents being administered under letters testa-
mentory or of administration, the authority for such action is clearly granted by RCW
11.28.250. It provides that, "Whenever the court has reason to believe that any
executor or administrator has wasted, embezzled, or mismanaged, or is about to waste
or embezzle the property of the estate committed to his charge, or has committed, or
is about to commit a fraud upon the estate, and is incompetent to act, or is perma-
nently removed from the state, and has wrongfully neglected the estate, or has
neglected to perform any acts as such executor or administrator, or for any other
cause or reason which to the court appears necessary, it shall have the power and
authority, after citation and hearing to revoke such letters. The manner of the citation
and of the service of the same and of the time of the hearing shall be wholly in the
discretion of the court, and if the court for any such reasons revokes such letters the
powers of such executor or administrator shall at once cease, and it shall be the duty
of the court immediately to appoint some other executor or administrator, as in this
act provided." (Emphasis added.) Also in point is RCW 11.28.160, which reads: "the
court appointing any executor or administrator shall have authority for any cause
deemed sufficient, to cancel and annul such letters and appoint other executors or
administrators in the place of those removed." And finally, see RCW 11.44.050, which
expressly provides that the court may revoke letters testamentary or of administration
for failure to file an inventory in accordance with RCW 11.44.010. To the effect that
the trial court's discretion in this area is broad, see Wolfe's Estate, 186 Wash. 216, 47
P.2d 1066 (1936).
The court's power to remove a guardian is also clearly spelled out by statute in
Washington. RCW 11.88.120 provides that "the court in all cases shall have power
to remove guardians for good and sufficient reasons, which shall be entered of record,
and to appoint others in their places. . . ." Again, the only limitation on the court's
1959]
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the event a successor is appointed, a follow-up check will then be
made by the records checker after the new appointee has had a
reasonable time to clear up the deficiencies leading to his appoint-
ment.
The results of the program thus far can perhaps most meaning-
fully be expressed first in terms of specific facts and figures, from
which certain general conclusions then may be suggested. At the
time of this writing, every estate of a decedent which was opened
in King County during the years 1952-1956 has been checked.
Additionally each guardianship estate opened during the years 1949-
1958 has been screened. In terms of numbers, this amounts to a
check of approximately 13,500 estate files and 7,500 guardianship
files. Of this number, approximately 1,200 estate files, or 8.8 per
cent of the total number checked, and 900 guardianship files, or 12
per cent of the total number checked, have been found deficient in
one or more of the items noted above. Letters have been written,
either to the attorney of record, or directly to the personal repre-
power is that it act for good and sufficient reasons, and not arbitrarily. In re Robin-
son, 9 Wn.2d 525, 115 P.2d 734 (1941) ; In re Hemrich, 187 Wash. 21, 59 P.2d 748(1936) ; In re Shapiro's Estate, 131 Wash. 653, 230 Pac. 627 (1924).
The picture is not so clear, however, when it comes to executors under non-interven-
tion wills. So long as the non-intervention executor remains cloaked with the powers
granted him by the will, administering under the will rather than under letters testa-
mentary granted by the court, the provisions of RCW 11.28.150, and RCW 11.28.250
authorizing revocation of letters would not seem to apply. But it also appears that,
according to RCW 11.68.010, until an estate to be administered under a non-interven-
tion will has been found fully solvent, it, like all other estates, is to be administered
under direction of the court. In State ex rel. Lauridsen v. Superior Court, 179 Wash.
198, 208, 37 P.2d 209 (1934), the court apparently sustained this view when it said:
"in the case of non-intervention wills, when it appears that the estate is fully solvent,
the executor shall have the power to manage and administer the estate without inter-
vention of the court. The corollary to this is that, until the estate is found and declared
solvent, it must be administered under the direction of the court and subject to its
orders." (Emphasis added.)
Therefore, until an estate under a non-intervention will is declared solvent, it is
concluded that the powers granted the court by RCW 11.28.160 and RCW 11.28.250,
as well as RCW 11.44.050, to remove executors and appoint successors on its own
motion, apply to non-intervention estates as well as those estates to be administered
under letters testamentary or of administration. In re Wolfe's Estate, 186 Wash. 216,
57 P.2d 1066 (1936), is in accord with this conclusion.
After a non-intervention estate has been found solvent, it appears that the court is
without power to remove the executor directly. A petition first must be brought by a
creditor or distributee under RCW 11.68.030, requesting that the executor be shorn
of his non-intervention powers for failure to execute his trust faithfully and to take
care to promote the interests of all parties. If the court finds the petitioner's request
well taken, it may then require that the estate be administered as in the case of routine
estates. In re Hooper's Estate, 76 Wash. 72, 135 Pac. 813 (1913). At this point admin-
istration again is under direction of the court, so that the above-cited statutory provi-
sions for removal of an executor or administrator would apply.
However, if the executor does not attempt to qualify as a non-intervention executor
at all, but submits to the jurisdiction of the court regarding control of administration,
the limitations of RCW 11.68.030 do not apply, so that the executor may be removed
by the court on its own motion under RCW 11.28.250. In re Clawson's Estate, 3
Wn.2d 509, 101 P.2d 986 (1940).
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sentative or guardian, in each of these cases where deficiencies were
discovered. In response to these letters, the deficiencies noted have
been corrected, or a satisfactory explanation as to the state of the file
has been received without any further action by the committee or
the court in the case of approximately 56 per cent of the estates and
approximately 67 per cent of the guardianships originally found to
be deficient. Citations have been issued, as related above, in the
remaining cases, and removal of the personal representative or
guardian and appointment of a successor has been necessary in the
case fo 40 estates, or 3.3 per cent of those originally found deficient,
and in the case of 10 guardianships, or 1.1 per cent of those originally
found deficient.
Broken down by particular items of deficiency, the picture, in terms
of the number of occurrences of each deficiency and of approximate
percentages of the total number of files checked, is as indicated in
the following table:
A. Estates of decedents :21
1. Defect in qualification, 14 (.1%).
2. Failure to file inventory, 37 (.25%).
3. Failure to appraise (where required), 45 (.3%).
4. Failure to file affidavit in accordance with RCW 11.76.040,
325 (5.2%).2
5. Failure to file proof of publication of notice to creditors, 30 (.2%).
6. Apparent failure to pay creditors' claims, 21 (.15%).
7. Apparent failure to pay appraisers' fees, 38 (.25%).
8. Failure to close estate promptly, 860 (6.1%) .23
9. Amount of bond insufficient, 610 (5%).
B. Guardianship estates:
1. Defect in qualification, 5 (.06%).
2. Failure to file inventory, 27 (2.3%).
3. Failure to file proof of publication of notice to creditors,
370 (10.3%)'
4. Failure to render biennial report, 470 (5.6%).
5. Apparent unauthorized expenditures, 53 (.6%).
6. Failure to close and render final account, where required,
20 (.25%).
7. Amount of bond insufficient, 483 (6%) .25
21 This category includes both non-intervention and routine estates.
22 RCW 11.76.040 became effective in January 1955. Therefore, only those estates
to which this statute applies are considered in this calculation.
23 Since no estate files opened subsequent to December 1956 have yet been screened,
in no case has an estate which has been in probate for less than eighteen months been
determined to be deficient for failure to close.
24 As this requirement applies only to guardianships of incompetents, only those
types have been considered in this calculation.
25 This calculation, as well as the calculation relating to bonds on estates of
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Conclusions-Respective responsibilities of court and counsel.
It is clear from the facts and figures above related that: (1) In a
large majority of estates and guardianships, administration is pro-
ceeding according to law without any prompting by the court. (2) Of
those estates and guardianships initially found deficient, more than
half are promptly put in order in response to the initial letters sent
out by the probate committee, and all but a relatively few of those
matters not cleared up in response to the letters are remedied in
response to the citations issued upon failure to respond to the letters.
(3) With respect to individual items of deficiency, there are certain
matters causing considerably more difficulty than others. The first
two of these conclusions will form the basis of the discussion immedi-
ately following; the third conclusion will produce the subject matter
of the writer's discussion of particular legal problems involved in the
administrations of estates and guardianships.
From the first two of these conclusions and from the additional
elementary fact that most personal representatives and guardians
are laymen who function upon their lawyers' advice, it seems justifi-
able to conclude that, while many attorneys are properly guiding
their clients in the performance of their duties as personal representa-
tives and guardians, some are not so doing until they are prodded
into action by the court.2 However, this is not meant to suggest that
all of the deficient estates and guardianships are the result of lax
supervision by counsel. The probate committee has also uncovered
in some cases ample evidence of simple refusals on the part of the
personal representative or guardian to heed advice given by his
attorney.
Several questions, not easily resolved, are suggested by the facts
and conclusions related so far. Involving the age-old controversy of
the respective responsibilities of court and counsel in the administra-
tion of the law, they are as follows:
(1) What is the nature of the attorney's responsibility to his client,
where the client is acting as a personal representative or guardian,
to inform him of his duties, and to supervise their performance?
(2) What is the extent of the court's responsibility in supervising the
decedents, is at best a rough estimate, as the probate judge has on many occasions
entered orders altering the amount of bond without previous action by the probate
committee or the records checker as the files have come before him for other action.26 An additional fact revealed by the records checking program to date seems rele-
vant at this point, which is that, notwithstanding the relatively small percentage of
estates and guardianships found to be deficient overall, a much larger percentage of
those administered by clients of certain attorneys have been found to be deficient.
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administration of estates and guardianships?
(3) What is the responsibility of the attorney, as an officer of the
court, to inform the court of the failure of his client who is acting
as a personal representative or guardian to function properly as
such?
The responsibility of the attorney to his client, where the client is
acting as a personal representative or guardian, would seem to be
covered by the Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 32, which reads
in part as follows:
Correspondingly, he [the attorney] advances the honor of his pro-
fession and the best interests of his client when he renders service or
gives advice tending to impress upon the client and his undertaking
exact compliance with the strictest principles of moral law. He must
also observe and advise his client to observe the statute law, though
until a statute shall have been construed and interpreted by competent
adjudication, he is free and entitled to advise as to its validity and as
to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning and extent.
The probate committee has taken the position that, in fulfillment
of this responsibility, the attorney whose client is acting as a personal
representative or guardian should fully describe to the client the
nature of his obligations and should continue to supervise compliance
with those obligations so long as he remains the attorney of record of
the particular personal representative or guardian. It has come to
the attention of the probate committee that one leading Seattle law
firm, as a matter of practice, provides each of its clients who has
been appointed a personal representative or guardian with a form
letter, detailing in simple, non-legal terms the duties of the client's
office and explaining the reason behind each of the rules relating to
those duties. This practice, coupled with continual personal contact
between the attorney and client during the active period of adminis-
tration, is commended by the committee and is recommended to other
attorneys.
It is also felt by the probate committee that the court shares in the
responsibility of insuring that estates and guardianships are admin-
istered according to law; hence, the present program. RCW 11.02.020
provides that the court shall have full and ample power and authority
to administer and settle all estates of decedents, minors, insane and
mentally incompetent persons in this act mentioned. Further, this
section provides that if the provisions of the code with reference to
the administration and settlement of such estates should in any case
19591
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and under any circumstances be inapplicable or insufficient or doubt-
ful, the court shall nevertheless have full power and authority to pro-
ceed with such administration and settlement in any manner and
way which to the court seems right and proper, all to the end that
such estates may be by the court administered upon and settled.
This section of the probate code both defines the extent of the
court's power, and thereby provides a broad legislative grant of
authority to effect such a program as is now operating in King County,
and also by implication defines the extent of the court's responsibility
in the area of administration of estates and guardianships. But this
responsibility, the committee feels, is coupled with the responsibility
of the attorney, not only to his client under Canon 32, but also, as an
officer of the court, to inform the court of the client's refusal to heed
the attorney's advice to perform the duties required, so that the court
may take appropriate action. Some attorneys have been reluctant
to come forward with such information, feeling that Canon of Pro-
fessional Ethics 37, relating to the confidences of a client, as well as
Canon 28, relating to stirring up litigation, forbid such action by him.
As this is being written, a committee of the Washington State Bar
Association is considering the problem; so, within the reasonably fore-
seeable future a ruling may be had which will provide the answer.
Certain recurring legal problems. As has been noted, several of
the items checked by the records checker in the process of searching
dormant estates and guardianships have accounted for a substantially
larger proportion of the deficiencies reported than have the other mat-
ters checked. Therefore, it seems appropriate to conclude with a brief
review of those matters which are apparently misunderstood by more
than a few attorneys.
The first of these problems is that of who is entitled to written
notice of the appointment of an executor or administrator of a dece-
dent's estate and of the pendency of probate under RCW 11.76.040,
which reads in part as follows:
Within 20 days after his appointment, the executor or administrator of
the estate of a decedent shall cause written notice of his said appoint-
ment and of the pendency of probate proceedings, to be mailed to each
heir and distributee of said estate whose name and address is known to
him, proof of which shall be made by affidavit and filed in the cause.2 7
This statutory requirement became effective in 1955. Some attor-
27 See also Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, Rule 41 (1).
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neys appear to believe that it has been complied with when, in the case
of probate based upon a will, notice has been given to all persons
named as distributees in the will whose addresses are known to the
executor. It is submitted that the language of the statute requires
that, in addition, notice be given to those persons who would take by
intestate succession in the event the will was held to be invalid. The
significant words are, "shall cause written notice... to be mailed to
each heir and distributee.... ." (Emphasis added.) Their significance
can best be seen by contrasting the language used here with that of
the following paragraph of RCW 11.76.040,28 which requires that
written notice of the hearing on final account and petition for dis-
tribution be given to "each heir or distributee." (Emphasis added.)
The Washington court has not yet construed the pertinent language
of this statute. However, the identical distinction appears in the two
sections of Rule 41, Rules of Pleading, Practice, and Proceedure, pro-
mulgated by the court. It seems, therefore, that both the legislature
and the court intended for both those who would take but for the will
and those who are to take if the will is valid to receive notice of the
appointment of the executor and the pendency of probate proceed-
ings, while only those who are to take under the will are entitled to
notice of the hearing on final account and petition for distribution.
It is suggested that the purpose of the statute and rule is to afford
those who could take if the will was invalid the opportunity to appear
and contest its validity under RCW 11.24.010.29 Since such a contest
can be had only within the six-month period immediately following
probate of the will, and since no distribution can be decreed until at
least six months after probate of the will, due to the requirements of
RCW 11.40.010, relative to claims of creditors, it follows that a rule
requiring notice of the pendency of probate would be designed in
part to give an opportunity to contest, whereas a requirement of notice
of hearing on final account and petition for distribution would not
have such a purpose."
28 See also Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure, Rule 41 (2).
20 "If any person interested in any will shall appear within six months immediately
following the probate or rejection thereof, and by petition to the superior court havingjurisdiction contest the validity of said will, or appear to have the will proven which
has been rejected, he shall file a petition containing his objections and exceptions to said
will, or to the rejection thereof .. . If no person shall appear within the time afore-
said, the probate or rejection of such will shall be binding and final as to all the world."
20 The portion of RCW 11.76.040 dealing with the notice to be given of the hearing
on final account and petition for distribution (see also Rules of Pleading, Practice and
Procedure, Rule 41 (2) ) appears to have been clearly motivated by the case of Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 US 306 (1950). In that case the United
States Supreme Court held that notice by publication of a hearing on final account
1959]
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A second item accounting for a large proportion of deficient estates
has been simply a failure on the part of the executor or administrator
to complete administration as rapidly as possible. RCW 11.48.010
expressly provides that "it shall be the duty of every executor or
administrator to settle the estate in his hands as rapidly and as
quickly as possible." 31
By far the largest group of estates which have been reported as
deficient for failure to close are non-intervention estates. Prior to the
enactment of Laws of 1955, chapter 205, section 5, it was permissible
for a non-intervention executor to make a final report and obtain
what in essence was a decree of distribution; but it was not necessary
for him to close in this or any other manner. 2 In 1955, however, the
legislature, by enacting the above statute,3 made it mandatory for
of a common trust fund established under the New York banking law did not meet
the requirements of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution, as to those beneficiaries whose names and whereabouts were known
to the trustee. One who would inherit under the laws of intestate succession is as
effectively deprived of property if the decedent leaves a will cutting him out of his
intestate share and the will, for want of a contest, is admitted by the court, as is a
beneficiary of a trust or a distributee under a will where the trustee or executor has
failed to administer properly over the property he holds for the benficiary or dis-
tributee. It seems reasonable to assume that a notice designed to provide an opportunity
to contest a will is just as much a requirement of due process of law as is a notice
designed to provide an opportunity to appear and object to a trustee's or executor's
final account31 In an opinion affirming an order granting a distributee's petition that the execu-
trix who had failed to wind up the estate for over three years from date of probate of
the will be compelled to close within sixty days of the date of the order, the Washing-
ton court made the following statement: "Our statutes contemplate that estates shall
ordinarily be closed shortly after the six months period allowed for filing claims."
In re Johnson's Estate, 192 Wash. 439, 447, 73 P.2d 755, 759 (1937). In an earlier
case, National Bank of Commerce v. Petterson, 179 Wash. 638, 38 P.2d 361 (1934),
the court recognized the statutory duty of an executor to settle the estates in his hands
as quickly and as rapidly as possible, but then denied its power to compel compliance
with this duty. This language was reiterated in a subsequent case also involving the
Petterson estate, In re Petterson's Estate, 12 Wn2d 686, 123 P.2d 733 (1942). Both
the Johnson case and the Petterson cases involved a non-intervention will and were
decided prior to the enactment of Laws of 1955, ch. 205, § 5, requiring the filing of a
declaration of completion in the event the non-intervention administrator decides not
to close by the more formal petition for a final decree under RCW 11.76.030. Since,
prior to the enactment of the requirement of filing a declaration of closing, it had been
held not necessary for a non-intervention executor to close at all [Schirmer v. Nether-
cutt, 157 Wash. 172, 180 Pac. 265 (1930)], the language of the Petterson cases is
understandable. The holding in the Johnson case is a bit tenuous, but it is submitted
that today there is a clearly enforceable duty on the part of the non-intervention
executor or administrator to close the estate within a reasonable time. An order of
the nature of that made in the Johnson case, supra, will now lie, regardless of whether
administration is with or without court intervention. It ought also to be noted that,
as of the date of this writing, all of the dormant estates that have been screened by
the probate committee were originally opened at least two years ago, and many date
back to as long as seven or eight years ago. So in view of the language of the Johnson
case, supra, clearly a reasonable time for completion of administration has elapsed.
32 See Schirmer v. Nethercutt note 31, supra.
83 Codified as a part of RCW 11.68.010. See Gose and Hawley, Probate Legislation
Enacted by the 1955 Session of the Washington Legislature, 31 WASH. L. REv. 22, 30(1956) ; see also discussion in note 30, supra, as to the enforceability of the statutory
duty to close.
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the non-intervention executor to file a declaration of closing if he did
not seek a final decree of distribution.
It should be noted that only non-intervention estates may be closed
by filing a declaration of closing. The check of dormant estates has
revealed a few cases of attempts to close routine estates by this method,
rather than by the formal procedure prescribed by RCW 11.76.030.
These attempts for the most part have resulted from a misunder-
standing of two other statutes: so much of RCW 11.68.010-.040 as
bears upon what is a non-intervention will, and RCW 11.28.070,
describing the powers of an administrator with will annexed.
In the early case of Schufeldt v. Hughes,84 the Washington court
held that the testator's intention to dispense with administration must
be shown by express words or necessary implication. A direct state-
ment in the will that it is to be administered without court interven-
tion is sufficient to make the will non-intervention, even though it
does not further provide in express language that no letters "testa-
mentary are to be required or that the executor is to have the power,
after the estate has been adjudged solvent, to mortgage, lease, sell,
and convey the real and personal property of the testator without a
court order."5 The non-issuance of letters testamentary, except for
the limited purposes of admission of the will to probate, filing of
inventory, and publication of notice to creditors," and the powers to
mortgage, lease, sell, and convey the real and personal property of
the testator without court order follow as a matter of course once a
will is determined to be non-intervention2' Also, though there appear
to be no cases clearly in point, the probate committee has taken the
position that a will which does not expressly provide for administra-
tion without court intervention but does expressly provide that the
executor is to have all of the powers enumerated in RCW 11.68.040,
i.e., the power to mortgage, lease, sell, and convey the real and
personal property of the testator without a court order, is to be
treated as a non-intervention will. But a will which merely provides
that the named executor is to serve without bond, as provided for in
RCW 11.28.200, is considered by the probate committee, and reason-
ably so it would seem, not to be a non-intervention will. An estate
governed by such a will, not being a non-intervention estate, cannot
be closed by the filing of a certificate of completion.
" 55 Wash. 246, 104 Pac. 253 (1909).
31 Miller v. Borst, 11 Wash. 260, 39 Pac. 662 (1895).36 RCV 11.68.010.
37RCW 11.68.040.
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RCW 11.28.070, providing for the authority of an administrator
with will annexed, which for many years provided simply that
"administrators with will annexed shall have the same authority as
the executor named in the will would have had, and their acts shall
be as effectual for every purpose," was amended by Laws of 1955,
chapter 205, section 3. It provides that such administrators "shall
not lease, mortgage, pledge, exchange, sell or convey any real or
personal property of the estate except under order of the court and
pursuant to procedure under existing laws pertaining to the admin-
istration of estates in cases of intestacy, unless the powers expressed
in the will are directory and not discretionary." Except for the prob-
lem of what powers are "directory and not discretionary," this amend-
ment appears to resolve the conflict between this section of the code
prior to the amendment, and RCW 11.68.020, which provides that
"in all cases, if the party named in [a non-intervention will] as
executor declines to execute the trust or dies or is otherwise disabled
for any cause from acting as such executor, letters testamentary or
of administration shall issue and the estate be settled as in other
cases." 8 (Emphasis added.) Therefore, it has been concluded by
the probate committee that, except where the powers granted in a
non-intervention will are directory and not discretionary, a non-inter-
vention estate which has passed into the hands of an administrator
with will annexed for purposes of administration cannot be closed by
the filing of a declaration of closing but must be closed under the
provisions of RCW 11.76.030.
Two matters accounting for a large proportion of the deficient
guardianships are the requirement, in the case of guardianships of
incompetent persons, that notice to creditors of the appointment of
the guardian be published, 9 and the requirement that all guardians
render an account of their receipts and expenditures at least every
two years.4"
The first of these requirements does not seem to call for any dis-
38 The previous confusion is illustrated by two papers presented at the Legal Insti-
tute held at the University of Washington law school May 23, 1941: Foster, Powers
and Duties of Executors and Administrators, c.ta Under Non-Intervention Wills, 16
WAs H. L. REv. 196 (1941), and a critique of that article by Johnson, 16 VAsH. L.
R.v. 200 (1941). Gose and Hawley, Probate Legislation Enacted by the 1955 Session
of the Washington Legislature, 31 WAsH. L. IEv. 22, 29 (1956), takes the view that
the amendment "seems entirely clear and certainly it is now definite that as to the
matters mentioned in the amendment, an administrator with will annexed does not have
the same powers as an executor named in the will."
39 RCW 11.92.030.
4o RCW 11.92.040 (3).
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cussion. The statute is clear and free from ambiguity, but it is not
being complied with in a substantial number of guardianships. It is
true that, unlike RCW 11.40.010, which requires publication of
notice to creditors of a decedent's estate "immediately after appoint-
ment," (Emphasis added.) RCW 11.92.030 merely requires publica-
tion "after appointment and qualification." But the probate com-
mittee has taken the position that, since it is one of the duties of a
guardian "to pay all just debts due from the ward out of the estate
in his hands,"' 1 it was contemplated by the legislature that notice
to creditors of an incompetent ward is to be published soon after
appointment and qualification of the guardian.
The requirement of a biennial report seems equally clear and unam-
biguous. The difficulty here seems to be one created by simple inad-
vertance on the part of the guardian and his attorney. Prior to 1955,
the statute provided that, as a penalty for failure to render a report
once every two years or whenever asked to do so, the guardian should
receive no allowance for his services and be liable to the ward on his
bond for costs, disbursements, and attorney's fees in any proceeding
brought against him to enforce the rights of the ward, his liability
not to exceed ten per cent of the estate. This statute provided some
incentive to the guardian to set up a system for reminding himself
of the due dates of his reports. In 1955, by section 15, chapter 205,
Laws of 1955, the legislature repealed this sanction and provided
instead that the clerk of the court was to notify each guardian to file
an account, whenever he failed to do so for a period of two years.
In the event of a failure to heed the clerk's notification, the legisla-
ture left it to the court to determine what action would be proper.2
This change cast upon the clerk's office a burden which it was not
equipped to handle; so by section 1, chapter 64, Laws of 1957, the
provision calling for the clerk to remind the guardian of his duty was
repealed. The probate committee, therefore, has taken over this task
in King County, and in conjunction with a judicious exercise of the
power of the court to remove guardians under RCW 11.88.120, it is
hoped that the number of guardianships found deficient for failure to
file biennial reports can be substantially reduced.
Finally, a glance back at the statistics reported above will reveal
that a relatively large percentage of both estates and guardianships
41 RCW 11.92.040 (5).
42 Gose and Hawley, Probate Legislation Enacted by the 1955 Session of the Wash-
ington Legislature, 31 WAsH. L. Rxv. 22, 37 (1956).
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have been reported as deficient because the amount of the personal
representative's or guardian's bond has been found insufficient. Both
RCW 11.28.180, with respect to personal representatives' bonds, and
RCW 11.88.100, relating to guardians' bonds, expressly allow the
court wide discretion in the matter of fixing the amount of such bonds.
RCW 11.28.200 even allows the court to require a bond of an
executor, where it is deemed necessary, in cases where the testator's
will has expressly waived the requirement of a bond. All these sec-
tions of the code contemplate periodic reviews by the court of the
amount of the bond. The court's power to fix and alter the amount
of the bond is perhaps the most effective check it has on the activities
of the personal representative and guardian. Unlike the other defi-
ciencies noted in the screening of dormant estates and guardianships,
the allowing of an inadequate bond is more a reflection on the laxness
of the court than it is on any lack of proper functioning by the
attorney or his client, the personal representative or guardian. Opinions
may differ as to what is -an adequate bond, but the probate com-
mittee has taken the position that a guardian's bond is inadequate
if it does not approximate the value of the personal property in the
estate. This of course does not apply where RCW 11.88.100 requires
no bond at all, i.e., where the guardian is a bank or trust company,
or where the value of the estate does not exceed five hundred dollars,
and the guardian is the parent of, or a person standing in loco parentis
to, the ward.- With respect to administrators' bonds, except in the
case of administration by the surviving spouse where the value of
the estate does not exceed the exemptions allowed by law to the
surviving spouse," the suggested rule-of-thumb is that the bond
equal at least half the value of the personal property of the estate."
The same rule is applied in the case of executors and administrators
w.w.a. who are acting without non-intervention powers, unless the
requirement of a bond has been waived in accordance with RCW
11.28.200 and there appears to be no reason for imposing a bond
notwithstanding the waiver. As for the executor who is administering
an estate under non-intervention powers granted by the will rather
43 RCW 11.28.180.
44 Since neither a guardian nor an administrator or executor not having non-inter-
vention powers can sell real property of the estate without first obtaining a court order
of authorization, it has not been thought necessary to require that the bond cover the
value of such property until such time as it is converted by sale into personalty. How-
ever, it has become routine procedure in King County for the probate judge, upon
approving a sale of realty, to review the bond at that time and to revise its amount in
accordance with the amount to be received upon sale of the realty.
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than under letters testamentary issued by the court, the committee
has taken the position that no bond is required at all, for two reasons.
In the first place, the overwhelming majority of non-intervention
wills executed contain an express waiver of such a requirement. Sec-
ondly, and of more importance in view of the power of the court to
impose a bond even in the face of an express waiver when it is
deemed necessary, RCW 11.28.180, which provides for the bonding of
personal representatives of estates of decedents, apparently only
applies in cases where those representatives are acting under letters
testamentary or of administration."'
45 If this is the true meaning of the statute, it becomes immediately apparent that the
express waiver of the requirement of a bond which commonly appears in the non-inter-
vention will is mere surplusage. The writer's research has revealed only two Wash-
ington cases in which the court has broadly indicated that a non-intervention executor
is not required to give a bond: Walla Walla v. Moore, 16 Wash. 339, 47 Pac. 753
(1897), and In re Passage's Estate, 122 Wash. 249, 210 Pac. 370 (1922). However,
the wills in both of these cases not only provided that the will was to be administered
without court intervention, but expressly waived the requirement of a bond. It is sug-
gested that neither these cases nor the statute RCW 11.28.180, are clear cut authority
for the proposition that the court has no power to require a bond of a non-intervention
executor at any time. The reader is again referred to the reasoning employed in note
20, sitpra, relative to the power of the court to remove a non-intervention executor on
its own motion prior to a determination that the estate is solvent; that is, that until
such time, the executor acts under authority granted by the court, and not under the
non-intervention powers granted by the will. It would seem reasonable to conclude
that during that period of court supervision, the court might, for good cause, require
a bond to be posted, to be exonerated upon the determination of the solvency of the
estate. It may well be that, because of the special trust inferentially invested in a non-
intervention executor by the testator, where the will also waives the requirement of a
bond, the court should be less disposed to exercise its power to require a bond in
spite of the waiver than it would be in the face of a waiver contained in a will which
is not also a non-intervention will.
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